REMUNERATION REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AND THE SUPERVISORY BOARD PURSUANT TO SECTION 162 GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (AKTG) FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2023

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
BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD REMUNERATION SYSTEM

The Supervisory Board has adjusted the remuneration of the Executive Board, effective from the financial year 2019, to the methodology described in this remuneration report. The remuneration system pursuant to Section 120a (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) was submitted to the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on July 8, 2020, and approved by the majority of 98.56 %. The remuneration system applied to all Executive Board members active in the financial year 2023 and those who have left starting with 2019.

The remuneration of the members of the Executive Board is determined by their tasks and their own individual performance as well as by the success of the company. The amount of remuneration is based overall on the level customary in the comparable business environment. In the financial year 2022, the Supervisory Board mandated an external consultant with assessing the appropriateness of Executive Board remuneration. The peer group used in the process consisted of companies represented on the German "SDAX", Deutsche Börse AG's small cap index, to which Salzgitter AG belongs.

Executive Board remuneration is made up of fixed remuneration consisting of a basic salary, supplementary benefits and a pension commitment, along with variable remuneration (cf. Figure 1):

Figure 1: Overview of the components of Executive Board remuneration



FIXED REMUNERATION

BASIC SALARY

The basic salary is granted in the form of an amount of money per year individually agreed between the Supervisory Board and the respective Executive Board member in the Executive Board member's employment contract. The basic salary is to be paid out in twelve identical equal monthly installments at the end of the month respectively (monthly salary).

SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS

Supplementary benefits consist of benefits in kind, such as granting the private use of a company car, expenses for a collective accident insurance, assuming of the costs of medical check-ups, as well as any benefits in kind subject to flat-rate taxation.

PENSION COMMITMENT

The company pension commitments vary:

For the period up until December 31, 2018, all Executive Board members in active service for the company at the time received a commitment for payment of a pension, the amount of which depends on the length of service to the Group and the fixed basic salary (commitment to pension benefits). The pension commitments in favor of Executive Board members Becker and Kieckbusch existing as of December 31, 2018, were formalized as of this date. As from January 1, 2019, these commitments were supplemented by defined contribution commitments, as described in the following.

For the period starting January 1, 2019, Executive Board members Becker and Kieckbusch, as well as Mr. Groebler as from the date when he took up his office, received the commitment that the company will make certain amount of money available on a pension account (defined contribution commitment) for each year of Executive Board service. The annual pension contribution currently amounts to $k \in 342$ for Mr. Groebler and $k \in 210$ for Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch. In addition, a guaranteed annual interest credit that depends on the respectively valid statutory maximum technical interest rate applicable to the life insurance industry (guaranteed interest rate) in accordance with the actuarial reserve ordinance (DeckRV) will also be taken account of on the pension account. The amount is invested in accordance with the life cycle model defined under the conditions for deferred compensation in the Salzgitter Group (SZAG model), while taking account of the securities determined by the Investment Committee for the company pension scheme within the Salzgitter


Group. If higher interest after tax is generated by the funds invested, the amount will be credited when pension payments begin.

If an Executive Board member leaves the service of the company before reaching retirement age under the statutory retirement pension scheme, the Board member will receive the plan assets on the pension account as a one-off retirement lump sum or, upon application, in ten annual installments. If an Executive Board member leaves the service of the company without having reached retirement age, the Board member will be granted a vested entitlement to the pension account in accordance with the statutory provisions of the German Occupational Retirement Provision Act. Upon request, the Executive Board member will receive early retirement capital, at the age of 62 at the earliest.

VARIABLE REMUNERATION

Variable remuneration presupposes the achieving of targets. This remuneration consists, on the one hand, of an annual bonus, and of a performance bonus (Performance Cash Award) on the other. A target bonus is agreed in the Executive Board employment contract for the annual bonus, and a target amount for the performance bonus (cf. Figure 2).

Figure 2: Overview of the variable remuneration components



ANNUAL BONUS


The precondition for the disbursement of an annual bonus is split as follows: 70 % for achieving a financial performance target, measured on the basis of earnings before taxes (EBT), and 30 % for individual performance, measured by qualitative criteria determined by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of each year and pertaining to the respective year (cf. Figure 3).

Figure 3: Annual bonus system



The payout multiplier for the EBT performance target is calculated by comparing the EBT of the respective financial year with the EBT of the preceding financial year (cf. Figure 4). If EBT remains the same compared with the previous year, the multiplier is 100 % of the target bonus agreed in the executive employment contract. If EBT is raised by 50 % compared with the previous year, the maximum multiplier of 150 % is achieved. If EBT is −50 % compared with the previous year, the minimum multiplier of 50 % is achieved. Linear interpolation is applied if targets are achieved between the fixed intervals. If the minimum multiplier is not achieved, the payout multiplier is 0 %. If EBT is negative for the second time in a row, or if EBT in the previous year or in the current financial year is less than €1 million respectively, the Supervisory Board can determine the degree to which goals have been achieved at their own discretion. The same applies if an exceptional event occurs due to which the Executive Board member receives a higher or lower disbursement amount than he would have been entitled to had this exceptional event not taken place, without this having been warranted by the Board member's performance. If a positive EBT is achieved in the previous financial year and a negative EBT in the current financial year, the multiplier is 0 %.

Figure 4: Bonus curve - EBT target annual bonus



In setting the criteria for individual performance the Supervisory Board may factor in a series of different aspects, such as strategic corporate development, specific projects, occupational safety and employee development. After a financial year has ended, the individual performance is assessed by the Supervisory Board using the predefined criteria. The degree to which targets have been achieved can be determined by the Supervisory Board on a linear basis between $0\,\%$ and $150\,\%$.

The annual bonus is paid out at 50 % after the respective financial year has ended (one-year variable remuneration). The remaining 50 % (initial value) of the annual bonus is retained and converted into virtual shares of the company (share deferral) for a three-year period (lockup period) that commences at the end of the respective financial year (share deferral, cf. Figure 5). The number of virtual shares is calculated from the arithmetic average of the Salzgitter share's Xetra closing price on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the last 30 trading days prior to the beginning of the lockup period. Upon expiration of the lockup period, the number of virtual shares are multiplied by the arithmetic average of the Salzgitter share's Xetra closing price on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the last 30 days before the end of the lockup period, plus the fictitious dividend payments on the virtual shares, and paid out. The resulting amount disbursed is limited to 150 % of the initial value.

Figure 5: Share deferral system



In the event of exceptional, unforeseeable developments, the Supervisory Board may reduce the annual bonus at its own discretion.

The annual bonus is structured to be an incentive for implementing the company's strategic direction. In the opinion of the Supervisory Board, a key parameter for measuring the success of the corporate strategy and the company's long-term development consists of the earnings before taxes (EBT) achieved for the respective year. The Supervisory Board has therefore selected the achieving of stable or improved EBT measured against the previous year as the principal performance criterion for granting the annual bonus.

Along with this criterion, the Supervisory Board is of the opinion that non-financial criteria also have an effect on the success of the corporate strategy and the company's long-term good development. The Supervisory Board has therefore defined additional, annual performance criteria for the granting of the annual bonus. The Executive Board remuneration system thus also makes a definitive contribution to promoting the corporate strategy and the long-term development of the company.

Transferring part of the annual bonus to a share deferral component with a lockup period of three years promotes the corporate strategy and the company's long-term development by incentivizing the Executive Board members to increase the enterprise value and by directly aligning the interests of the Executive Board with those of the shareholders, as well as enhancing the company's attractiveness in the capital market. Share deferral therefore promotes the long-term development of the company.

PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD

The precondition for the disbursement of a performance cash award is also split at 70 % for achieving a financial performance target, in this case measured by the return on capital employed (ROCE) = EBIT I = (= EBT + interest expense excluding the interest portion of allocations to pension provisions) in relation to the total of shareholders' equity (without calculation of accrued and deferred taxes), tax provisions, interest-bearing liabilities (excluding pension provisions) and liabilities from financial leasing and forfaiting expressed as an average of a four-year performance period, and at 30 % for achieving stakeholder objectives, e.g. sustainability objectives, set by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of each year for the respective performance period (cf. Figure 6).

Figure 6: Performance cash award system




The average of the ROCE figures achieved after the end of the respective financial years during the performance period is used to calculate the payout amount for the ROCE performance target. The average of the budgeted ROCE figures of the respective financial years is then deducted from this amount.

The resulting difference between the target figure and actual figure in percentage points is compared with the figures fixed by the Supervisory Board at the start of the respective performance period for a multiplier of 100% (target figure), of 50% (minimum figure) and of 200% (maximum figure) of the target amount agreed in the respective Executive Board member's employment contract, taking account of the general development of business and the economic prospects of Salzgitter AG. Linear interpolation is applied if targets are achieved between the fixed intervals. If an unusual event or an unusual development results in an Executive Board member receiving a higher or lower payout amount compared with the amount that he would have been entitled to if this event or development had not occurred, without this being attributable to the performance of the respective Executive Board member, the Supervisory Board can raise or lower the payout amount.

If the minimum figure is not reached, the payout multiplier is 0%. Exceeding the maximum figure will not increase the payout multiplier.

Example: If the target figure for the difference between the average ROCE achieved and the average budgeted ROCE is set at 0 %, with minimum set at -3 % and a maximum figure of 2 %, the multiplier is 100 % of the target amount assuming that the exact amount of the budgeted ROCE is achieved. If ROCE is one percentage point higher than budgeted, the multiplier will be 150 %. If ROCE is one percentage point lower than budgeted, the multiplier will be 83.33 %

Figure 7: Example of bonus curve - ROCE target performance cash award



In setting the aforementioned stakeholder objectives the Supervisory Board may factor in a series of different aspects, such as environmental matters, occupational safety or employee development. Achieving the targets is assessed by the Supervisory Board after the performance period has ended. The degree to which targets have been achieved can be determined by the Supervisory Board on a linear basis between 0 % and 200 %. The performance cash award is paid out at the end of the respective performance period.

The performance cash award is designed to provide incentives for implementing the company's strategy. One of the Group's key control parameters for the success of the corporate strategy and its long-term successful development is the achieving of return on capital employed (ROCE) that can be considered an indicator of whether and to what extent investments are eligible for implementation to promote sustainable growth. For this reason, the Supervisory Board has selected the

achieving of the planned ROCE in the performance period as the principal performance criterion for the performance cash award.

Along with this criterion, the Supervisory Board is of the opinion that non-financial criteria also have an effect on the success of the corporate strategy and the company's long-term good development. In respect of granting the performance cash award, the Supervisory Board therefore additionally determines stakeholder and especially sustainability goals per year. The Executive Board remuneration system thus also makes a definitive contribution to promoting the corporate strategy and the long-term development of the company.

REMUNERATION OF THE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS AND IMPACT ON EXECUTIVE BOARD REMUNERATION

In the financial year 2023 that was dominated by high inflation rates and cooling economic momentum, the Salzgitter Group generated a pre-tax profit of $\ \in \ 238.4 \ \text{million}$ (2022: $\ \in \ 1,245.4 \ \text{million}$). The Steel Production, Steel Processing and Technology business units were the main drivers of this result. From $\ \in \ 204.1 \ \text{million}$ after-tax profit yields a return on capital employed of $\ 5.6\%$ (ROCE; 2022: $\ 20.1\%$).

Following an encouraging start to 2023, economic conditions in most markets increasingly deteriorated. Running counter to sector trends, only the filling and packaging machinery business performed very well over the year as a whole, enabling the Technology Business Unit to deliver a record result. The Group's external sales declined to $\[mathbb{e}\]$ 10.8 billion due above all to lower average selling prices for steel products (2022: $\[mathbb{e}\]$ 12.6 billion). This because most steel product prices declined from their high year-earlier level during virtually the entire financial year. Prices only bottomed out in the final quarter.

In accordance with the remuneration system, the development of all financial ratios directly impacts the achieved and expected amount of the Executive Board's performance-related variable remuneration components. Owing to the considerable reduction of around \in 1 billion in earnings before taxes compared with the financial year 2022, the performance target that depends on how the EBT develops was not achieved, resulting in a target achievement of 0 %.

The end of the financial year 2023 marks the end of the lockup period and performance period of the share deferral and performance cash award granted in the financial year 2020. The payouts from these multi-year variable remuneration components have been taken into account accordingly in the 2023 remuneration granted and owed to Prof. Dr.-lng. Fuhrmann, former Chief Executive Officer who has left the company in the financial year 2021, as well as to Executive Board members Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch.

REMUNERATION DISCLOSURE

Executive Board remuneration in the 2023 financial year corresponded to the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on July 8, 2020 (available at https://www.salzgitter-ag.com/en/company/executive-board.html):

Table 1 shows a breakdown of the remuneration granted and owed to the individual Executive Board members in the financial year 2023, with separate disclosures on their relative share in overall remuneration and comparison with the previous financial year. Along with the basic salaries and the supplementary benefits effectively granted in the respective financial year, the variable remuneration components are shown for each year in which they were earned (one-year variable remuneration – annual bonus (50% cash portion)) and the year in which the lockup period (multi-year variable remuneration – share deferral) and the performance period (multi-year variable remuneration – performance cash award) ends, also if disbursement is only due at a later point in time. Similarly, special compensation is also disclosed in the year to which it pertains, even if disbursement is only at a later point in time.

Table 1: Remuneration granted and owed pursuant to Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)

				Gun ve Board from 202 cutive Officer since		til Chief Financial Office 01 since 2011/02/0			ncial Officer		(Michael Kieckbusch Chief Human Resources Officer since 2013/02/20	
	1		2023		2022		2023		2022		2023		2022
in k€		absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %
Fixed salary ¹		1,185	89 %	1,140	61%	816	54%	771	47%	696	49%	651	42 %
Benefits		20	2%	31	2%	24	2%	25	2 %	48	3%	45	3%
Total fixed salary		1,205	91%	1,171	62 %	840	56%	796	48 %	744	53%	696	45%
One-year variable remuneration	Annual bonus (50 % cash portion)	124	9%	713	38%	65	4%	435	26%	65	5%	435	28%
Multi-year variable remuneration	Share deferral	-	0%	-	0%	221	15%	179	11%	221	16%	179	12%
	Performance cash award	-	0%	-	0%	383	25%	239	14%	383	27%	239	15%
Total variable remuneration		124	9%	713	38%	669	44%	852	52 %	669	47%	852	55 %
Special compensation		-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
Pension payments		-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
Total remuneration		1,329	100 %	1,883	100 %	1,509	100%	1,649	100 %	1,412	100%	1,549	100%

¹ In the financial year 2023, Mr. Becker was granted an amount of k€10 (2022: k€60) for temporarily discharging additional duties as head of the Steel Processing Business Unit. The fixed salary for Mr. Groebler was increased by k€15 per month to k€110 effective October 2023. The fixed salary for Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch was increased by k€5 per month to k€58 effective October 2022.

Table 2 shows the contractually agreed target remuneration as well as pension expenses.

Table 2: Target remuneration figures for the financial year 2023

			ber of the Execut /06/30, Chief Exe	ive Board from 20				Chief Fi	rkhard Becker nancial Officer nce 2011/02/01			Chief Human Res	nel Kieckbusch ources Officer ce 2013/02/20
in k€		2022 Target	2023 Target	2023 min.	2023 max.	2022 Target	2023 Target	2023 min.	2023 max.	2022 Target	2023 Target	2023 min.	2023 max.
Fixed salary ¹		1,140	1,185	1,185	1,185	771	816	816	816	651	696	696	696
Benefits		31	20	20	20	25	24	24	24	45	48	48	48
Total fixed salary		1,171	1,205	1,205	1,205	796	840	840	840	696	744	744	744
One-year variable remuneration	Annual bonus (50 % cash portion)	475	550	0	825	290	290	0	435	290	290	0	435
Multi-year variable remuneration	Share deferral	475	550	0	1,238	290	290	0	653	290	290	0	653
	Performance cash award	380	440	0	880	232	232	0	464	232	232	0	464
Total variable remuneration		1,330	1,540	0	2,943	812	812	0	1,552	812	812	0	1,552
Special compensation		-	-	-	-	-	_	-	-	-	_	-	-
Pension expenses ²		253	182	182	182	391	352	352	352	434	360	360	360
Total remuneration		2,754	2,927	1,387	4,330	2,000	2,004	1,192	2,744	1,943	1,915	1,103	2,655

¹ In the financial year 2023, Mr. Becker was granted an amount of k€120 (2022: k€60) for temporarily discharging additional duties as head of the Steel Processing Business Unit. The fixed salary for Mr. Groebler was increased by k€15 per month to k€110 effective October 2023. The fixed salary for Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch was increased by k€5 per month to k€58 effective October 2022.

² Service cost pursuant to IAS 19

EXPLANATIONS ON FIXED REMUNERATION

The amount of the basic salary fundamentally corresponds to the monetary amounts individually agreed in the Executive Board employment contracts. The supplementary benefits reflect the monetary value of the benefits in kind granted in the respective employment contract, which essentially consist of the benefit derived from the private use of a company car. At this point, reference is made to the presentation in Table 1 and to the following special circumstances:

The monthly salary of Chief Executive Officer Groebler has been raised by $k \in 15$ to $k \in 110$ as from October 1, 2023. The Supervisory Board examined the appropriateness of the increase in remuneration in 2022, both by way of an external comparison with other SDAX companies and also through an internal comparison with the development of the remuneration paid to the Salzgitter Group's employees. In raising Mr. Groebler's fixed salary, the initial mark-down in remuneration at the start of his employment compared with the former Chief Executive Officer has been compensated, along with the general increases in wages and salaries applicable since he took up office in May 2021.

In the financial year 2023, Mr. Becker was granted an amount of k€ 120 for temporarily discharging additional duties as head of the Mannesmann Business Unit.

EXPLANATIONS ON VARIABLE REMUNERATION

ANNUAL BONUS

The 2023 annual bonus was calculated in accordance with the remuneration system comprising the target bonus and the multiplier (between 0 % and 150 %) agreed individually with each Executive Board member in their employment contracts. The target bonus amounted to 10 monthly salaries for all Executive Board members. The multiplier depended on fulfilling the performance criteria in the financial year 2023, specifically – as provided for under the remuneration system – 70 % of earnings before taxes (EBT) at Group level in the financial year 2023 in comparison with 2022 (the relevant performance criteria are precisely defined in the remuneration system) and 30 % depending on the individual performance in the financial year 2023, the latter measured by the criteria defined by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of the financial year for all Executive Board members equally, as follows:

/ Criterion 1: Reducing the occurrence of accidents (15 %-points): If the lost time injury frequency rate (LTIF rate: number of lost time injuries with days of incapacity per 1 million hours worked) is lowered by 5 % compared with 2022, target attainment was set at 100 %, at 50 % for lowering

the LTIF rate by up to 2.5 %, and at 150 % for lowering the LTIF rate by 7.5 % or more. Linear interpolation between these minimum and maximum values is applied to target achievement. If the LTIF rate is reduced by less than 2.5 % compared with 2022 or rises compared with 2022, target attainment is 0 %.

Criterion 2 – Digitalization (15 %-points): Based on the digitalization concept drawn up in 2022, further training modules (also for commercial employees) were to be developed in 2023, along with implementing a concept for continuous professional development focusing on digitalization for managers, as well as fully digitalizing training at the Salzgitter Campus. If all three subtasks are fulfilled, the Supervisory Board set target attainment at 100 %, at between 75 % and 50 % if one or two subtasks respectively were underachieved, and at 115 %, 130 % and 150 % respectively if one, two or all three of the subtasks were overachieved. If all three subtasks were underachieved, target attainment was set at 0 %.

CALCULATION OF THE MULTIPLIER

EBT target:

In the financial year 2023, EBT declined to $\[mathbb{e}\]$ 238.4 million, down from $\[mathbb{e}\]$ 1,245.4 million in the financial year 2022 and marking a decrease of more than 50 %. Target attainment is therefore calculated at 0 % for all Executive Board members.

Individual performance:

Re Criterion 1: an LTIF rate of 7.60 was achieved in the financial year 2023. Compared with the LTIF rate of 6.78 in the financial year 2022, this represents an increase of 12.1%. Target attainment therefore amounts to 0%. With regard to Criterion 2, the Supervisory Board determined a target attainment of 150% based on its assessment of the degree to which tasks were achieved. The resulting individual multiplier amounts (amounts disbursed) for the 2023 annual bonus are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Annual bonus 2023 calculations

	Target bonus	Multiplier EBT target (weighting 70 %)	Multiplier individual targets (weighting 30%)	Annual bonus 2023 (of which 50 $\%$ cash / 50 $\%$ share deferral)
Groebler	1,100,000 €	0%	75 %	247,500 €
Becker	580,000 €	0%	75 %	130,500 €
Kieckbusch	580,000€	0%	75 %	130,500 €

The 2023 annual bonus of each individual Executive Board member will be paid out in the financial year 2024 in accordance with the specifications of the remuneration system as follows: 50 % in cash and 50 % invested in virtual shares of the company (share deferral). The individually allocated virtual shares from share deferral 2023 are shown in Table 4. At the end of the three-year lockup period, i.e. at the start of 2026, the stock market value of the shares at that time, plus dividend disbursed during the lockup period, capped at 150 % of the initial value (50 % of the 2023 annual bonus), is to be paid out.

Table 4: Calculation of the number of virtual shares from 2023 share deferral

	Initial value share deferral (50 $\%$ of the annual bonus)	Ø XETRA closing prices	Number of virtual shares
Groebler	123,750 €	27.78067 €	4,454.536
Becker	65,250 €	27.78067 €	2,348.755
Kieckbusch	65,250 €	27.78067 €	2,348.755

OUTLOOK FOR THE PERFORMANCE TARGETS FOR ASSESSING THE ANNUAL BONUS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2024:

The target and benchmark for the EBT financial performance target correspond to those set for the financial year 2023. With regard to assessing the individual performance, identical criteria were determined for all Executive Board members, as follows:

- Criterion 1: Reducing the occurrence of accidents (15 %-points): If the LTIF rate is reduced by 5 % compared with 2023, target attainment is set at 100 %, at 50 % for a reduction of 2.5 %, and at 150 % for a reduction of by 7.5 % or more. Linear interpolation between these minimum and maximum values is applied to target achievement. If the reduction in the LTIF rate is less than 2.5 % compared with 2023, target attainment is 0 %. Target attainment is assessed taking account of the company's own workforce and the deployment of temporary staff outsourced. In addition, the Executive Board is required to craft an overarching strategy for health and safety at work at the Salzgitter Group.
- / Criterion 2: Demographic change / key functions (15 %-points): With regard to the imminent transformation process, the Executive Board has been requested to carry out demographic and fluctuation analyses (most especially including employees with key qualifications), to prepare an

analysis of the extent and the main reasons for unwanted fluctuation, to implement successor concepts in the major companies, and to develop further measures to enhance employer attractiveness and foster employee retention. Depending on the (employment-weighted) proportion of the companies in which the relevant analyses have been carried out and/or the successor concepts established, the Supervisory Board has defined specific target achievement levels at between 0 and 150 %.

PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD

The performance cash award 2023 is calculated in accordance with the remuneration system based on the target amount agreed with each individual Executive Board member in their respective employment contracts and the multiplier (between 0 % and 200 %). The multiplier depends on the degree to which the performance criteria have been fulfilled in the performance period 2023 through 2026, – as laid down by the remuneration system – specifically 70 % depending on the return on capital employed (ROCE) and 30 % depending on the achievement of the stakeholder objectives of "ESG Rating Improvement" and "Scrap Recycling Expansion" determined by the Supervisory Board at the start of the financial year for all Executive Board members equally.

CALCULATION OF THE PAYMENT MULTIPLIER FOR THE PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD 2023

ROCE target:

Regarding the target attainment of the return on capital employed (ROCE target) over the performance period 2023 through 2026, the Supervisory Board defined a target of 0 %-points, a minimum of -3 %-points, and a maximum of +3.5 %-points as deviation from an average ROCE budgeted at 7.8 % at the start of the financial year 2023. To obtain the multiplier at the end of the performance period – as provided for under the remuneration system – i.e. after the end of the financial year 2026, target attainment is calculated and the multiplier determined.

Stakeholder objective:

As non-financial objective, two objectives, each weighted at 15 %, were set over the period from 2023 to 2026, namely on the one hand, of achieving key sustainability certifications and ambitious ESG ratings and, on the other, of developing a recycling strategy that would enable the scrap volume to be continuously expanded during the performance period. The degree to which the targets have been attained will be assessed at the end of the performance period, i.e. once the financial year 2026 has ended, and will depend on the quality of the ESG rating concept and the position the Salzgitter Group has achieved in the relevant ratings and certifications, along with growth in the scrap volume additionally secured.

The performance cash award 2023 will be paid out in cash after the end of the performance period from 2023 through 2026.

OUTLOOK FOR THE PERFORMANCE TARGETS FOR MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2024:

Regarding the ROCE financial performance target weighted at 70 %, the Supervisory Board defined the following over the performance period from 2024 to 2027: a target value of -0.6 %-points, a minimum value of -3.6 %-points and a maximum value of +3.4 %-points as deviation given an average ROCE budgeted at 8.6 %.

The sustainability goal of "Securing the Supply of Green Electricity" was set as a stakeholder objective. Target attainment in the performance period from 2024 through 2027 will be assessed depending on the proportion of electricity requirements of the respective subsequent year that can be secured via green electricity generated from renewable sources. To achieve 100% of the target in the first performance year 2024, a proportion of 40 % needs to be secured for the following year 2025, and a proportion of 50 % in each of the years following 2025 and 2026, with a proportion of 75% set in 2027 for the subsequent year of 2028.

EXPLANATIONS ON MULTI-YEAR VARIABLE REMUNERATION IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2020

The end of the financial year 2023 marked the conclusion of the lockup period and the performance period of the multi-year variable remuneration granted to the Executive Board in the financial year 2020. The respective amounts disbursed are included in the remuneration granted and owed for the financial year 2023 (cf. Table 1).

SHARE DEFERRAL 2020

The calculation of the amounts disbursed from Share Deferral 2020 is shown in Table 5. The virtual shares allocated to each Executive Board member from the individual Annual Bonus 2019 are multiplied by the arithmetic average of the Salzgitter share's Xetra closing price on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the last 30 days before the end of the lockup period, plus the fictitious dividend payments on the virtual shares, and paid out. The resulting amount disbursed is limited to 150 % of the initial value.

Table 5: Calculation of the amount disbursed from Share Deferral 2020

	Share deferral initial value	Starting share price	Number of virtual shares	Closing share price	Dividend payouts during the lockup period	Share deferral disbursement amount
Prof. DrIng. Fuhrmann	277,500 €	18.55217€	14,957.819	27.78067 €	1.75 €	416,250 €
Becker	147,075 €	18.55217€	7,927.644	27.78067 €	1.75 €	220,613 €
Kieckbusch	147,075 €	18.55217€	7,927.644	27.78067€	1.75€	220,613€

PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD 2020

The performance cash award 2020 is calculated in accordance with the remuneration system based on the target amount agreed with each individual Executive Board member in their respective employment contracts and the multiplier (between 0 % and 200 %). The multiplier depends on the degree to which the performance criteria have been fulfilled in the performance period 2020 through 2023, – as laid down by the remuneration system – specifically 70 % depending on ROCE and 30 % depending on the achievement of the non-financial objectives determined by the Supervisory Board at the start of the financial year 2020 for all Executive Board members equally.

ROCE target:

Regarding the target attainment of the return on capital employed (ROCE target) over the performance period 2020 through 2023, the Supervisory Board defined a target value of -2.4 %-points, a minimum value of -5.4 %-points, and a maximum value of +0.6 %-points at the start of the financial year 2020 as deviation from an average ROCE budgeted at 7.4 % over the performance period. If the deviation between ROCE achieved on average and budgeted on average, between minimum and target value and between target and maximum value, the multiplier will be calculated by way of interpolation. The arithmetic mean of the ROCEs achieved in the financial years from 2020 through 2023 amounts to 9.5 % (2020: -3.9 %, 2021: +16.2 %, 2022: +20.1 %; 2023: +5.6 %), the deviation between ROCE achieved on average and budgeted on average ROCE is therefore +2.1 %-points, and the multiplier for the ROCE target is therefore 200 %.

Stakeholder objectives:

The Supervisory Board defined the sustainable reduction in accident occurrence (Objective 1) and the sustainable stepping up of continuous professional development (Objective 2), each weighted at 15 %, as non-financial objectives over 2020 – 2023 performance period.

Achieving Objective 1 is to be measured using the average of the annual rate of change in the accident incidence rate over the performance period from 2020 through 2023. In the event of an average change in the accident incidence rate of 0 %, target attainment was set at 50 %, for a reduction of 5 % at 100 %, and for a reduction of 7.0 % or more at 200 % In the event of a higher accident incidence rate, target attainment was to be deemed not achieved.

Achieving Objective 2 was to be assessed based on whether a minimum of 80% of the workforce had taken part in at least one training measure in the financial year 2020 and 95% in each of the financial years 2021 through 2023. With regard to the financial years 2020 and 2021, the aforementioned participation rates were to be achieved only in the domestic Group companies and then worldwide in the years 2022 and 2023. Overall target attainment is calculated as the arithmetic average of the degrees to which targets were achieved in the four individual years, with a participation rate of 70% needing to be achieved in each year as a lower limit for target attainment of 50%. Given a participation rate of 90% or more in the financial year 2020 and of 100% in the years 2021 through 2023, target attainment was to be determined at 200%. With participation rates of less than 70%, target were to be deemed not achieved in the respective performance year.

Taking account of the results listed in Table 6, the Supervisory Board ascertained target attainment of Objective 1 at 81 % and of Objective 2 at 189.2 %.

Table 6: Non-financial objectives - Performance Cash Award 2020

	Ubjective Haccide	ent occurence)	urence) Objective 2 (continuous professional de				
Accident incidence rate previous year	Accident incidence rate	Change	Participant rate target	Participant rate actual	Target attainment		
13.63	11.33	-16.9%	80 %	88.40%	184.0%		
11.33	12.81	13.1%	95 %	99.64%	192.8%		
12.81	9.96	-22.2%	95 %	99.13%	182.6%		
9.96	11.33	13.8%	95 %	99.87%	197.4%		
		-3.1%			189.2%		
	incidence rate previous year 13.63 11.33	Accident incidence rate previous year Accident incidence rate 13.63 11.33 11.33 12.81 12.81 9.96	incidence rate previous year Accident incidence rate Change 13.63 11.33 -16.9% 11.33 12.81 13.1% 12.81 9.96 -22.2% 9.96 11.33 13.8%	Accident incidence rate previous year Accident incidence rate incidence rate Change Participant rate target 13.63 11.33 -16.9% 80% 11.33 12.81 13.1% 95% 12.81 9.96 -22.2% 95% 9.96 11.33 13.8% 95%	Accident incidence rate previous year Accident incidence rate previous year Accident incidence rate Change Participant rate target Participant rate actual 13.63 11.33 -16.9% 80% 88.40% 11.33 12.81 13.1% 95% 99.64% 12.81 9.96 -22.2% 95% 99.13% 9.96 11.33 13.8% 95% 99.87%		

¹ 2020/2021: Assessment on the basis of participation rate domestic, 2022/2023: assessment on the basis of participation rate worldwide.

The resulting amounts for disbursement for the Performance Cash Award 2020 are shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Calculation of the Performance Cash Award 2020

	Target	Multiplier ROCE target (weighting 70%)	Multiplier non- financial objectives (weighting 30%)	Performance cash award
Prof. DrIng. Fuhrmann	400,000€	200%	135.1%	722,120 €
Becker	212,000 €	200%	135.1%	382,724 €
Kieckbusch	212,000€	200%	135.1%	382,724 €

OTHER INFORMATION

The option under the remuneration system of reclaiming variable remuneration components was not utilized as there was no occasion or the preconditions to justify this.

The maximum remuneration under the remuneration system stands at $k \in 2,900$ for regular Executive Board members and at $k \in 5,100$ for the Chairman of the Executive Board. A conclusive assessment as to whether the defined maximum remuneration was adhered to can only be made at the end after the amounts from the respective share deferrals and performance cash awards are determined and will therefore be reported in the remuneration report for the financial year 2026.

In the financial year 2020, the maximum remuneration determined for the financial year 2019 of $k \in 5,100$ for the Chief Financial Officer and of $k \in 2,900$ for the regular Executive Board Members – also taking account of the amounts meanwhile disbursed from the multi-year variable remuneration components – have been adhered to (cf. Table 8).

Table 8: Adherence to the maximum remuneration for the financial year 2020 (including the multi-year variable remuneration granted and owed in the financial year 2023)

in k€		Prof. DrIng. Fuhrmann Chief Financial Officer from 1996/10/01 until 2011/01/31, Chief Executive Officer from 2011/02/01 until 2021/06/30	Becker Chief Financial Officer since 2011/02/01	Kieckbusch Chief Personnel Officer since 2013/02/20
Fixed salary ¹		1,140	604	604
Benefits		22	27	47
Total fixed salary		1,162	631	651
One-year variable remuneration	Annual bonus (50 % cash portion)	278	147	147
Multi-year variable remuneration	Share deferral	416	221	221
	Performance cash award	722	383	383
Total variable remuneration		1,416	750	750
Special compensation		-	-	-
Pension expenses ²		475	393	440
Total remuneration		3,053	1,774	1,841
Maximum remuneration		5,100	2,900	2,900

¹ Against the backdrop of the impact of the Corona pandemic and the resulting short-time work in the workforce, the Executive Board members voluntarily and individually waived 10 % of their monthly gross fixed salary for the six-month period from April through September 2020.

No benefits were granted or pledged by external parties to the individual members of the Executive Board in the financial year 2023 for their activities as Executive Board members.

² Service cost pursuant to IAS 19

In the event of regular termination of their service to the company, and upon reaching the age limits defined in retirement benefits commitments, the Executive Board members have been granted the payments shown in Table 9.

Table 9: Retirement benefits

		Annual payment upon pension eligibility ^{1,2,3}	Payment upon actual retirement (guaranteed amount)	Allocati	on to pension provision		Present value of the obligation
in€				according to HGB	according to IFRS	according to HGB	according to IFRS
Groebler Regular member of the Executive Board from 2021/05/17 until 2021/06/30.	2023	0	900,499	237,661	226,316	792,274	671,551
Chief Executive Officer since 2021/07/01	2022	0	557,106	231,888	106,978	554,613	445,235
Becker,	2023	348,299	965,765	1,103,353	1,755,851	10,946,758	8,790,883
Chief Financial Officer since 2011/02/01	2022	357,835	753,880	1,651,384	-1,963,700	9,843,405	7,035,032
Kieckbusch,	2023	353,213	965,765	754,589	1,343,219	9,539,109	7,358,286
Chief Personnel Officer since 2013/02/20	2022	342,925	753,880	1,542,041	-2,025,531	8,784,520	6,015,067

¹ Annual entitlement during service until the age of 65, including a former employer's pension commitment assumed against remuneration.

Should Executive Board activities be terminated without an important reason (Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch) without a material reason for which an Executive Board member is responsible (Mr. Groebler), the Executive Board members are entitled to the remuneration agreed until expiration of the respective contracts. This entitlement is, however, restricted to the amount of two years' remuneration (fixed and variable components (Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch) and to overall remuneration including supplementary benefits (Mr. Groebler)). In the event of premature termination of Executive Board member activities due to a change of control, the Board members are entitled under certain conditions to settlement in the amount of overall remuneration for the remaining term of their contracts of employment. This entitlement is capped at the value of three years of average overall remuneration (Mr. Becker) and at two years of average overall remuneration (Mr. Groebler and Mr. Kieckbusch), whereby the annual overall remuneration is to include overall remuneration including supplementary benefits (Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch) and the fixed salary and variable remuneration (Mr. Groebler).

² A cap of 96 % on the specified final pension of the financial year 2018 was contractually agreed with Mr. Becker, with dynamization as from 2019 in accordance with Essener Verband group adjustments.

³ A cap of 92% of the specified final pension of the financial year 2018 was contractually agreed with Mr. Kieckbusch; dynamization as from 2019 in accordance with Essener Verband group adjustments.

REMUNERATION OF FORMER EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBERS

Table 10 below shows the remuneration granted and owed in the past financial year to former Executive Board members whose service to the company ended in the last ten years, including the respective relative share pursuant to Section 162 AktG. In the financial year ended, exclusively lifetime pension payments to be remitted and remuneration for performing Supervisory Board mandates in the company's subsidiaries were granted.

Table 10: Remuneration granted and owed to former members of the Executive Board in the financial year 2023 pursuant to Section 162 AktG

		Volfgang Eging Board member 003/10/01 until 2014/09/30	1996/10/01 unti Executive Office	z-Jörg Fuhrmann ncial Officer from 2011/01/31, Chief r from 2011/02/01 until 2021/06/30	Executive Board n	Heinz Groschke nember Trading ıntil 2014/09/30	Executive Board me	irgen Schneider mber Personnel and Services until 2013/02/19
	in€	in %	in €	in %	in €	in %	in €	in %
Share deferral 2020	0	0%	416,250	22 %	0	0%	0	0%
Performance Cash Award 2020	0	0%	722,120	37 %	0	0%	0	0%
Pension payments	386,018	100%	793,000	41%	427,905	100%	150,933	100%
Supervisory Board remuneration	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total remuneration	386,018	100 %	1,931,370	100 %	427,905	100%	150,933	100%

REMUNERATION OF SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS

SUPERVISORY BOARD REMUNERATION SYSTEM

Each member of the Supervisory Board receives a fixed remuneration of \in 60,000 per financial year. This remuneration is double the amount for the Vice Chairman and three times the amount for the Chairman. In addition, each member receives \in 5,000 for committee activities, each committee chairman and each member of the Audit Committee \in 10,000, and the chairman of the Audit Committee \in 30,000. The Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the Vice Chairman are not remunerated for membership in the committees. The other Supervisory Board members are compensated for a maximum of two memberships in committees. An attendance fee of \in 500 is paid for participation in each Supervisory Board meeting (also by way of telephone or video conference); participation in a brief telephone consultation and decision making by way of telephone do not count insofar as participating in a meeting.

REMUNERATION RECEIVED BY THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD:

The individual members of the Supervisory Board received the following remuneration and attendance fees:

Table 11: Remuneration of Supervisory Board members in the financial year 2023

								Annual remuneration
			Fixed salary	Remunerati	on for committee duties		Attendance fee	Total remuneration
		in€	in %	in€	in %	in€	in %	in €
Heinz-Gerhard Wente	2023	180,000	97%	0	0%	5,500	3 %	185,500
(Chairman)	2022	180,000	97%	0	0%	5,000	3%	185,000
Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Urban	2023	120,000	96 %	0	0%	5,500	4 %	125,500
(Vice Chairman)	2022	120,000	96 %	0	0%	5,000	4%	125,000
Konrad Ackermann	2023	60,000	79 %	10,000	13 %	5,500	7%	75,500
	2022	60,000	74 %	15,000	19%	6,000	7%	81,000
Manuel Bloemers	2023	60,000	75 %	15,000	19%	5,000	6%	80,000
	2022	60,000	75 %	15,000	19%	5,000	6%	80,000
Ulrike Brouzi	2023	60,000	96 %	0	0%	2,500	4%	62,500
	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Hasan Cakir	2023	60,000	79 %	10,000	13%	5,500	7%	75,500
	2022	60,000	80 %	10,000	13%	5,000	7%	75,000
Dr. Bernd Drouven	2023	60,000	88 %	5,000	7%	3,500	5%	68,500
	2022	60,000	88 %	5,000	7%	3,500	5%	68,500
Roland Flach	2023	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
(until 2022/12/31)	2022	60,000	79 %	10,000	13%	5,500	7%	75,500
Marco Gasse	2023	55,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	58,000
(since 2023/02/21)	2022	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
Gabriele Handke	2023	60,000	96 %	0	0%	2,500	4%	62,500
	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Karin Hardekopf	2023	60,000	81%	10,000	13%	4,500	6%	74,500
(since 2023/01/01)	2022	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
Gerald Heere	2023	60,000	84 %	8,333	12 %	3,500	5%	71,833
(since 2023/01/03)	2022	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0

								Annual remuneration
			Fixed salary	Remunerati	on for committee duties		Attendance fee	Total remuneration
Reinhold Hilbers	2023	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
(until 2022/12/31)	2022	60,000	80 %	10,000	13%	5,000	7%	75,000
Norbert Keller	2023	5,000	100 %	0	0%	0	0%	5,000
(until 2023/01/31)	2022	60,000	96 %	0	0%	2,500	4%	62,500
Frank Klingebiel	2023	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Prof. Dr. Susanne Knorre	2023	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Heinz Kreuzer	2023	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Dirk Markowski	2023	40,000	95 %	0	0%	2,000	5%	42,000
(since 2023/05/25)	2022	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
Volker Mittelstädt	2023	25,000	94 %	0	0%	1,500	6%	26,500
(until 2023/05/25)	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Klaus Papenburg	2023	60,000	80 %	10,000	13 %	5,000	7%	75,000
	2022	60,000	90 %	3,333	5%	3,500	5%	66,833
Anja Piel	2023	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
	2022	60,000	97%	0	0%	2,000	3%	62,000
Prof. Dr. Joachim Schindler	2023	60,000	63 %	30,000	31%	5,500	6%	95,500
	2022	60,000	63 %	30,000	31%	5,500	6%	95,500
Christine Seemann	2023	60,000	79 %	10,000	13%	5,500	7%	75,500
	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Prof. Dr. DrIng. Birgit Spanner-Ulmer	2023	25,000	94 %	0	0%	1,500	6%	26,500
(until 2023/05/25)	2022	60,000	90 %	5,000	7%	2,000	3%	67,000
Clemens Spiller	2023	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
Dr. Susanna Zapreva-Hennerbichler	2023	40,000	95 %	0	0%	2,000	5%	42,000
(since 2023/05/25)	2022	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
Total	2023	1,450,000		108,333		84,500		1,642,833
	2022	1,440,000		103,333		79,500		1,622,833

In addition, the following Supervisory Board members received remuneration for Supervisory Board mandates of subsidiaries:

Table 12: Remuneration of Supervisory Board members serving at subsidiaries in the financial year 2023

		Annual remuneration						
		Fixed salary		Remuneration for committee duties		Attendance fee		Total remunera tion
		in €	in %	in €	in %	in €	in %	in €
Konrad Ackermann	2023	10,000	93%	0	0%	750	7%	10,750
(KHS)	2022	10,000	91%	0	0%	1,000	9%	11,000
Hasan Cakir	2023	8,000	95%	0	0%	400	5%	8,400
(SZFG)	2022	8,000	94%	0	0%	500	6%	8,500
Roland Flach	2023	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
(KHS)	2022	10,000	91%	0	0%	1,000	9%	11,000
Marko Gasse	2023	12,500	94%	0	0%	750	6%	13,250
(MPTDE/HKM)	2022	0	0%	0	0%	0	0 %	0
Gabriele Handke	2023	5,000	93%	0	0%	400	7%	5,400
(PTG)	2022	5,000	93%	0	0 %	400	7%	5,400
Norbert Keller	2023	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
(MPTDE)	2022	2,084	95%	0	0 %	100	5%	2,184
Dirk Markowski	2023	5,000	94%	0	0%	300	6%	5,300
(MPTDE)	2022	0	0%	0	0 %	0	0%	0
Volker Mittelstädt	2023	1,875	95%	0	0%	100	5%	1,975
(ILG)	2022	7,500	95%	0	0%	400	5%	7,900
Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Urban	2023	12,000	97%	0	0%	400	3%	12,400
(SZFG)	2022	12,000	96%	0	0%	500	4%	12,500
Total	2023	54,375		0		3,100		57,475
	2022	54,584		0		3,900		58,484

Die gewerkschaftsangehörigen Arbeitnehmervertreter haben erklärt, ihre Vergütung nach den Richtlinien des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes an die Hans-Böckler-Stiftung abzuführen.

COMPARATIVE CHART OF REMUNERATION AND EARNINGS TREND

The following comparative chart illustrates the year-on-year change in remuneration granted and owed to current and former members of the Executive Board and of the Supervisory Board, the company's earnings trend and employee remuneration based on full-time equivalents.

The remuneration of members of the Executive Board and of the Supervisory Board corresponds to the remuneration granted and owed in the respective financial years within the meaning of Section 162 (1) sentence 1 AktG and therefore to the disclosures in Tables 1 and 10 as well as 11 and 12 of this report. Along with the development of Salzgitter AG's annual net income, key indicators for the earnings trend also include consolidated earnings before taxes (EBT) that also functions as an assessment basis for the financial performance component as part of the annual bonus. The core workforce of the Salzgitter Group's companies domiciled in Germany was taken as a basis for assessing employee remuneration development. The internal group used for comparison purposes was deliberately restricted to Germany as the majority of the workforce (around 80 %) are employed here and because structural changes over time in the proportion of staff members employed abroad in the overall workforce would skew the informative value of a representative comparison on a global scale.

Table 13 shows a comparison of the percentage change in Executive Board member remuneration and Salzgitter AG's earning trend against the average employee remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis, compared with the previous year. Table 14 illustrates this comparison for members of the Supervisory Board.

Table 13: Comparison of the remuneration and earnings trend for members of the Executive Board (year-on-year change respectively)

	2023	2022	2021
Current members of the Executive Board			
Groebler	-29%	31%	(start of employment 2021)
Becker	-8%	55%	37%
Kieckbusch	-9%	51%	29 %
Former members of the Executive Board			
Eging	7%	2%	-2%
Prof. DrIng. Fuhrmann	27%	-16%	27%
Groschke	3%	1%	-1%
Schneider	8%	2%	0%
Earnings trend			
Annual profit SZAG (HGB)	-62%	23%	(turnaround 2021 vs. 2020)
Earnings before taxes (EBT) Salzgitter Group (IFRS)	-81%	76%	(turnaround 2021 vs. 2020)
Employees			
Domestic workforce	-2%	6%	12%

The significant reduction in compensation granted and owed in the financial year 2023 compared with the previous year is essentially due to the decline in the Salzgitter Group's result and the ensuing elimination of the financial portion of the one-year variable remuneration in 2023. Lower remuneration in the case of Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch is more moderate compared with Mr. Groebler as payment of the Performance Cash Award 2020 to Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch was due and the amount owed was significantly higher than the Performance Cash Award 2019 due and payable the year before. The decline in average employee remuneration in the financial year 2023 compared with the financial year 2022 is mainly attributable to the fact that the inflation-induced dynamic increase in basic salaries was overcompensated by the earnings-related decline in the performance-related remuneration owed for the 2023 financial year.

Table 14: Comparison of the remuneration and earnings trend for members of the Supervisory Board (year-on-year change respectively)

	2023	2022	2021
Current members of the Supervisory Board			
Heinz-Gerhard Wente (Chairman)	0%	1%	5%
Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Urban	0 %		
(Vice Chairman)		1%	6%
Konrad Ackermann	-6%	4%	4%
Manuel Bloemers (since 2021/07/01)	0%	113%	(start 2021)
Ulrike Brouzi	-1%	2 %	6%
Hasan Cakir	0%	3%	4%
Dr. Bernd Drouven	0%	1%	8%
Marko Gasse (since 2023/02/21)	(start 2023)	-	-
Gabriele Handke	-1%	1%	6%
Karin Hardekopf (since 2023/01/01)	(start 2023)	-	-
Gerald Heere (since 2023/01/03)	(start 2023)	-	-
Frank Klingebiel (since 2021/05/19)	0%	52%	(start 2021)
Prof. Dr. Susanne Knorre	0%	2%	6%
Heinz Kreuzer	0%	2%	6%
Dirk Markowski (since 2023/05/25)	(start 2023)	-	-
Klaus Papenburg (since 2021/07/01)	12 %	112 %	(start 2021)
Anja Piel (since 2021/07/22)	2%	97%	(start 2021)
Prof. Dr. Joachim Schindler	0%	3%	5%
Christine Seemann	20 %	2%	6%
Clemens Spiller	0%	2%	6%
Dr. Susanna Zapreva-Hennerbichler (since 2023/05/25)	(start 2023)		-

	2023	2022	2021
Former members of the Supervisory Board			
Annelie Buntenbach (until 2021/06/30)	-	-	-48%
Roland Flach (until 2022/12/31)	-	3%	5%
Reinhold Hilbers (until 2022/12/31)	-	3%	5%
Norbert Keller (until 2023/01/31)	-92%	-4%	8%
Dr. Dieter Köster (until 2021/06/30)	-	-	-47%
Bernd Lauenroth (until 2021/06/30)	-	-	-49%
Volker Mittelstädt (until 2023/05/25)	-60 %	1%	6%
Prof. Dr. DrIng. Birgit Spanner-Ulmer (until 2023/05/25)	-60%	-1%	7%
Dr. Werner Tegtmeier (until 2021/05/19)	-	-	-56%
Earnings trend			
Annual profit SZAG (HGB)	-62 %	23 %	(turnaround 2021)
Earnings before taxes (EBT) Salzgitter Group (IFRS)	-81%	76%	(turnaround 2021)
Employees			
Domestic workforce	-2%	6%	12%

Salzgitter, March 14, 2024

(Gunnar Groebler)

Chairman of the Executive Board and CEO (Burkhard Becker)

Member of the Executive Board Finance

from forth Buthood Brider of lenter

(Heinz-Gerhard Wente)

Chairman of the Supervisory Board